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This paper compares equilibrium technology adoption in a differentiated duopoly under two 
alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. It shows that the 
cost of technology has differential impact on technology adoption, that is, on cost-efficiency 
of the industry, under two alternative modes of product market competition. The possibility of 
ex post cost asymmetry between firms is higher under Bertrand competition than under 
Cournot competition. If the cost of technology is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher 
cost-efficiency than Cournot competition provided that the cost reducing effect of the 
technology is high. On the other hand, if the technology reduces the marginal cost of 
production by a very low amount, Cournot competition may lead to higher cost-efficiency 
than Bertrand competition. 
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This paper analyses the incentives to adopt cost-reducing technology by rms
in a horizontally dierentiated industry under two alternative categories of
product market competition, Cournot and Bertrand. When the cost of pro-
duction is endogenously determined, whether Bertrand or Cournot compe-
tition leads to more cost-eciency is an essential concern. Our framework
allows us to address the question of how the cost of technology aects this
comparison in a more general setting that does not rely on the assumption
of `positive primary outputs'.1
Whether higher or lower intensity of product market competition provides
greater incentive to adopt cost reducing technology is of perennial interest.
A large literature, dating at least as far back as Schumpeter (1943), em-
phasizes the role of the intensity of competition on innovation. Schumpeter
(1943) argues that, since the possibility to realize returns from technological
advancement is higher in concentrated markets, market concentration stim-
ulates innovation. In contrast, Arrow (1962) shows, comparing a perfectly
1The assumption of positive primary outputs, that is, both rms sell positive outputs,
even if prices are set at respective marginal costs, is crucial for ranking of the equilibrium
outputs and prots under the two categories of competition (Zanchettin, 2006; Amir and
Jin, 2001).
3competitive industry with a monopoly, that the gain from adopting cost-
reducing technology is higher under competitive environment. It indicates
that more competitive environment provides higher incentive to innovate.
Recently, the attention has turned to the comparison of two oligopolistic
industries. A number of recent studies, considering dierent scenarios, com-
pare rms' incentives to innovate cost-reducing technologies under alternative
modes of product market competition. It helps us to understand a variety
of issues: role of the nature of product dierentiation (Bester and Petrakis,
1993; Bonnano and Haworth, 1998), speed of technological progress (Aghion
et al., 1997) conict between static and dynamic eciency (Delbono and
Denicolo, 1990), impact of competition intensity (Boone, 2001), incentives
in mixed oligopoly (Lin and Ogawa, 2005), so on so forth. While char-
acterising equilibrium outcomes, these studies subscribe to the assumption
of `positive primary outputs' and thus restrict the space of the parameter
values, which is likely to distort equilibrium outcomes. Also, to the best of
our knowledge, existing studies does not analyse the impact of the cost of
technology on technology adoption decision explicitly. This paper attempts
to ll these gaps.
We consider a two stage non-cooperative game between two rms. Ini-
tially, both rms have symmetric cost functions. In the rst stage, each rm
simultaneously and independently decide whether to adopt a cost-reducing
technology, by incurring some given cost, or not. In the second stage, rms
engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand competition. The anal-
ysis shows that, if the cost of technology is high or moderate, Bertrand
competition provides stronger incentive to adopt cost-reducing technology
by a rm than Cournot competition unless the cost reducing eect of the
technology is very low. The intuition behind our result is as follows. Fol-
4lowing technology adoption, Bertrand competition not only leads to lower
prices (price eect), but also a lower market share of the non-adopting rm
(selection eect) than Cournot competition. While price eect generates
more disincentive to adopt technology under Bertrand competition than un-
der Cournot competition, the selection eect works in the opposite direction.
The selection eect dominates the price eect, and the net eect is higher
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
In equilibrium, only one rm adopts the technology under both Cournot
and Bertrand competition, if the cost of technology is moderate. But, if
the cost of technology is high, unless the cost reducing eect of the tech-
nology is very low, none of the rms adopt the technology under Cournot
competition whereas one rm adopts the technology under Bertrand com-
petition - an `Arrow-like' result, as the gain from technology adoption is
higher under Bertrand competition. On the other hand, if the cost of tech-
nology is low, both rms adopt the technology under Cournot competition
whereas only one rm adopts the technology under Bertrand competition -
a `Schumpeter-type' result. The reason is, since the price eect is smaller
under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, both rms
nd technology adoption to be gainful under Cournot competition whereas
under Bertrand competition a rm gains by adopting the technology when
the other rm does not adopt the technology. Under Bertrand competition,
the cost of technology needs to be reduced even further to a very low level to
induce both rms to adopt the technology. Clearly, the cost of technology has
dierential impact on the decision to adopt technology under two alternative
modes of competition. Moreover, it shows that the possibility of ex post
cost asymmetry between rms is higher under Bertrand competition than
under Cournot competition. When the cost reducing eect of the technology
5is high, the industry becomes more cost-ecient under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition provided that the cost of technology is high;
otherwise, both Bertrand and Cournot competition leads to the same level of
cost-eciency of the industry. On the other hand, if the technology reduces
the marginal cost of production by a very low amount, Cournot competition
leads to more cost-eciency of the industry than Bertrand competition un-
less the cost of technology is moderate. These results has implications to
`technology subsidy' policies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents
the model and characterises Bertrand and Cournot equilibria. Section 3
presents the comparison of equilibrium outcomes under alternative modes of
competition. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Let us consider an economy with an oligopolistic sector, consisting of two
rms - rm 1 and rm 2, that produce a dierentiated good and a competitive
numeraire sector. Initially, the marginal costs of production of rm 1 and
rm 2 are equal to c. That is, we start with a situation where there is no
asymmetry in terms of cost of production between rm 1 and rm 2.
On the demand side of the market, we consider the following utility func-
tion of the representative consumer.







2 + 2q1q2) + m;
where q1 and q2 are the quantities of the two dierentiated products produced
by rm 1 and rm 2, respectively, and m is the quantity of the numeraire
good.2 The degree of product dierentiation is measured by the parameter 
2This specication of the representative consumer's utility function is similar to that
6(0 <  < 1), lower value of  denotes higher degree of product dierentiation,
i.e., lower degree of substitutability between products. This specication of
U(:) generates the following linear demand structure.
qi =
1
1   2[a(1   )   pi + pj]; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (1)
Inverting (1), we get the following system of linear inverse demand functions.
pi = a   qi   qj; i;j = 1;2;i 6= j (2)
If prices leads to positive demand for both goods, demand is given by equa-
tions (1) and (2). But, if prices are such that qj = 1
1 2[a(1 ) pj+pi]  0,
the demand of good i reduces to qi = a   pi, as in Zanchettin (2006).
Now, before undertaking production decision, rms can adopt a new tech-
nology by incurring the exogenously determined xed cost r (> 0) to reduce
the cost of production. If a rm adopts the technology, its marginal cost of
production reduces to c   x (0 < x < c), whereas the non-adopting rm's
marginal cost remains at c.3 That is, we consider a two stage non-cooperative
game between the rms. The stages of the game are as follows.
Stage 1: Firm 1 and Firm 2 simultaneously and independently decide
whether to adopt the technology or not.
Stage 2: Firms engage either in Cournot competition or in Bertrand compe-
tition in the product market.
of Singh and Vives (1984), except that we consider same coecients of linear terms of q1
and q2 and normalise the coecients of the squared terms to one, to simplify the analysis.
3Alternatively, we can say that rms require to invest the amount r in R&D to get the
next best technology that reduces cost of production by the amount x. There is no other
possible intermediate technology, which can reduce cost by less than x, that requires less
investment in R&D. Also, the required investment to obtain more superior technology,
which reduces cost by more than x, is innite. There is no spillover eect of technology
adoption/R&D.
7Clearly, in stage 1, there are three possible cases for the decision to adopt
the technology: (1) no rm adopts the technology, (2) only one rm, either
rm 1 or rm 2, adopts the technology, and (3) both rm 1 and rm 2
adopt the technology. The mode of product market competition, Cournot
or Bertrand, in the second stage is exogenously determined. We solve this
game by the backward induction method.
Cournot Competition: We begin with the scenario where rms are en-
gaged in Cournot competition in the product market. First, we characterise
the product market equilibrium, given the choice of technology adoption of
rms in stage 1. When none of the rms adopts the technology, the equilib-
rium outcomes are as follows.
qC
1 (0;0) = pC




2 (0;0)   c = qC
2 (0;0);
C
1 (0;0) = C
2 (0;0) =
(a   c)2
(2 + )2; (3)
where qC
i (0;0);pC
i (0;0), and C
i (0;0) are equilibrium quantity, price and
prot, respectively, of rm i (= 1;2), under Cournot competition (denoted
by superscript C) when no rm adopts the technology (denoted by (0;0)).
If both rms adopt the technology, the equilibrium outcomes are
qC
1 (1;1) = pC
1 (1;1)   c + x =
(a   c + x)
2 + 
= pC
2 (1;1)   c + x = qC
2 (1;1);
C
1 (1;1) = C
2 (1;1) =
(a   c + x)2
(2 + )2   r; (4)
where (1;1) denotes that both rms adopt the technology. Finally, we con-
sider the situation when only one rm adopts the technology. Since initially
rms have equal marginal cost of production, without any loss of generality,
let us consider that only rm 1 adopts the technology. We denote this case
by (1;0). In this case, the marginal cost of production of rm 1 and rm
2 are c   x and c respectively. The equilibrium outputs, price-cost margins
8and prots are as follows.
qC
1 (1;0) = pC
1 (1;0)   c + x =
(2   )(a   c) + 2x
4   2 ;
qC
2 (1;0) = pC
2 (1;0)   c =
(2   )(a   c)   x
4   2 ;
C
1 (1;0) =
[(2   )(a   c) + 2x]2
(4   2)2   r;
C
2 (1;0) =
[(2   )(a   c)   x]2
(4   2)2 ; (5)
where (1;0) denotes that only rm 1 adopts the technology. Alternatively, if
only rm 2 adopts the technology, the equilibrium outcomes are symmetric
to that in (5): qC
1 (0;1) = qC
2 (1;0), qC
2 (0;1) = qC
1 (1;0), C
1 (0;1) = C
2 (1;0)
and C
2 (0;1) = C
1 (1;0), where (0;1) denotes that only rm 2 adopts the
technology.
Note that when only one rm, say rm 1, adopts the technology, the mode
of competition in the product market matters only if rm 1 cannot engage in
monopoly pricing without bearing any competitive pressure from rm 2 (the
non-adopting rm). Now, if the technology reduces marginal cost of rm 1
beyond a certain level, i.e., if the ex post eciency gap between the two rms
becomes suciently high, then irrespective of the mode of competition, rm
2 is driven out of the market and rm 1 enjoys absolute monopoly power.
Now, rm 1 sets the monopoly price pM
1 = a c+x
2 , if at prices p1 = pM
1 and




 .4 Since the mode of product market competition does not
matter when x 
(a c)(2 )
 , we consider the following.
x <
(a   c)(2   )

(6)
In other words, the relevant parameter space, in which the mode of product
market competition matters, is S = f0 <  < 1;0 < x <
(a c)(2 )
 g. Note
4Firm 2, i.e., the non-adopting rm, cannot engage in monopoly pricing unless products
are completely dierent ( = 0).
9that, in our case, the assumption of positive primary outputs is binding only
for the non-adopting rm (rm 2). If both prices are set at marginal costs,
p1 = c   x and p2 = c, the demand for non-adopting rm is positive only if
x <
(a c)(1 )
 . Clearly, the assumption of positive primary outputs curtails
the parameter space.
From (5), it is evident that higher x leads to higher output, price-cost
margin and prot of the technology adopting rm, but lower output, price-
cost margin and prot of the non-adopting rm. However, it is easy to check
that the non-adopting rm remains active under Cournot competition for all
x 2 S.
Next, we turn to the technology adoption decision in stage 1 of the game,
when rms are engaged in Cournot competition in stage 2. If rm 2 does not
adopt the technology, rm 1 adopts the technology provided that C
1 (1;0) >
C
1 (0;0) ) r <
4x2+4(2 )(a c)x
(4 2)2 =  rC, say. On the other hand, if rm 1
adopts the technology, rm 2 does not adopt the technology provided that
C
2 (1;0) > C
2 (1;1) ) r >
4(1 )x2+4(2 )(a c)x
(4 2)2 = rC, say. It is easy to observe
that rC <  rC. Therefore, since rms are ex ante symmetric in terms of cost
of production, only one rm (either rm 1 or rm 2) adopts the technology in
equilibrium when rC < r <  rC. Alternatively, in equilibrium, no rm adopts
the technology when r >  rC, and both rms adopt the technology provided
that r < rC.
Lemma 1: Under Cournot competition in the product market, the equi-
librium technology adoption is as follows. (a) If the cost of technology (r) is
in the intermediate range, i.e., if rC < r <  rC, only one rm adopts the cost-
reducing technology; (b) if r < rC (r >  rC), both rms (no rm) adopt(s) the
technology, where rC =
4(1 )x2+4(2 )(a c)x
(4 2)2 and  rC =
4x2+4(2 )(a c)x
(4 2)2 . Both
rms remain active in the market irrespective of the cost of technology.
10Bertrand Competition: We rst characterise the equilibrium outcomes
of the product market competition, where rms are competing in terms of
price, given the technology adoption decision of rms. When none of the rms
adopt the technology, each rm has the marginal cost equal to c; therefore,




1 (0;0)   c
1   2 =
(a   c)
(2   )(1 + )
=
pB
2 (0;0)   c
1   2 = qB
2 (0;0);
B
1 (0;0) = B
2 (0;0) =
(a   c)2(1   )




i (0;0), and B
i (0;0) are equilibrium quantity, price and
prot, respectively, of rm i (= 1;2), under Bertrand competition (denoted
by superscript B) when no rm adopts the technology (denoted by (0;0)).
On the other hand, if both rms adopt the technology, each rm's marginal




1 (1;1)   c + x
1   2 =
(a   c + x)
(2   )(1 + )
=
pB
2 (1;1)   c + x
1   2 = qB
2 (1;1);
B
1 (1;1) = B
2 (1;1) =
(a   c + x)2(1   )
(2   )2(1 + )
  r; (8)
where (1, 1) denotes that both rms adopt the technology. Note that, under
Bertrand competition, both rms adopt the technology provided the price
eect does not lead to B
i (1;1)  0, i = 1;2.
If only one rm (say, rm 1) adopts the technology and both rms are




1 (1;0)   c + x
1   2 =
(2      2)(a   c) + (2   2)x





2 (1;0)   c
1   2 =
(2      2)(a   c)   x




[(2      2)(a   c) + (2   2)x]2




[(2      2)(a   c)   x]2
(4   2)2(1   2)
; (9)
11where (1;0) denotes that only rm 1 adopts the technology. Alternatively, if
only rm 2 adopts the technology, the equilibrium outcomes are symmetric
to that in (9): qB
1 (0;1) = qB
2 (1;0), qB
2 (0;1) = qB
1 (1;0), B
1 (0;1) = B
2 (1;0)
and B
2 (0;1) = B
1 (1;0), where (0;1) denotes that only rm 2 adopts the
technology.
However, the non-adopting rm (say, rm 2) is active in Bertrand equi-
librium (qB
2 (1;0) > 0) provided that x <
(a c)(2  2)
 . If, on the contrary,
(a   c)(2      2)

 x <
(a   c)(2   )

; (10)
the non-adopting rm is driven out of the market. However, the technol-
ogy adopting rm (say, rm 1) cannot engage in monopoly pricing without
bearing any competitive pressure from the non-adopting rm, since we con-
sider that the eciency gain through technology adoption is not drastic (i.e.,
x <
(a c)(2 )
 ). That is, the technology adopting rm cannot enjoy absolute
monopoly power. In other words, though the non-adopting rm is driven out
of the market, it exerts competitive pressure on the technology adopting rm.
If the amount of marginal cost reduction (x) due to technology adoption is
in the range as specied in (10), in equilibrium, under Bertrand competition
the technology adopting rm engages in limit-pricing, which keeps the non-
adopting rm out of the market. On the contrary, the non-adopting rm
remains active under Cournot competition for all x 2 S. The limit-pricing
equilibrium under Bertrand competition is as follows.
qL
2 (1;0) = pL
2(1;0)   c = L







1(1;0)   c + x =





(a   c)fx   (a   c)(1   )g
2   r; (11)
where the superscript L denotes limit-pricing under Bertrand equilibrium
12and (1;0) denotes that only rm 1 adopts the technology. If only rm 2
adopts the technology, the equilibrium outcomes are symmetric to that in
(11), that is, qL
2 (0;1) = qL
1 (1;0), qL







2 (0;1) = L
1 (1;0) and L
1 (0;1) = L
2 (1;0). Note that
the possibility of limit-pricing increases with a decrease in the degree of
product dierentiation (increase in ).5 Nonetheless, even if the degree of
product dierentiation is high ( is low), it is optimum for the technology
adopting rm to engage in limit-pricing.
Next, we analyse the technology adoption decision of rms in stage 1,
when rms are engaged in Bertrand competition in the product market.
From the above discussion, it is clear that there are two scenarios: (a)
(a c)(2  2)
  x <
(a c)(2 )
 , i.e, limit-pricing occurs in equilibrium in
stage 2 when only one rm (say, rm 1) adopts the technology; and (b)
0 < x <
(a c)(2  2)
 , i.e, limit-pricing does not occur in equilibrium.
In the rst scenario, if rm 2 does not adopt the technology, rm 1 adopts
the technology provided that L
1 (1;0) > B




(2 )2(1+) =  rL, say. On the other hand, if rm 1 adopts the technology,
rm 2 does not adopt the technology provided that L




(2 )2(1+) = rL, say. It implies that, since rms are ex ante symmet-
ric, in equilibrium both rms adopt the technology, if r < rL. But, if r >  rL,
no rm adopts the technology in equilibrium. For intermediate costs of the
technology, rL < r <  rL, only one rm adopts the technology in equilibrium.
In the second scenario (0 < x <
(a c)(2  2)
 ) also we get similar equilib-
rium outcomes: if rB < r <  rB, only one rm adopts the technology; but,
if r < rB (r >  rB), both rms (none) adopt(s) the technology, where rB =










Clearly, rB < rL and  rB <  rL.
Lemma 2: When rms are engaged in Bertrand competition in the
product market, if the amount of marginal cost reduction (x) due to tech-
nology adoption is such that
(a c)(2  2)
  x <
(a c)(2 )
 , in equilibrium
only one rm adopts the cost-reducing technology and the technology adopt-
ing rm engages in limit-pricing provided that rL < r <  rL; but, when
r < rL (r >  rL), both rms (no rm) adopt(s) the technology, where rL =
(a c+x)2(1 )




(2 )2(1+). On the other hand,
if 0 < x <
(a c)(2  2)
 , both rms (no rm) adopt(s) the technology in
equilibrium provided that r < rB (r >  rB); but, only one rm adopts the










3 Comparison of Cournot and Bertrand Equi-
libria
In this section, we compare Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Let us begin
with the scenario in which the marginal cost reduction (x) through the tech-
nology adoption is relatively high, that is,
(a c)(2  2)
  x <
(a c)(2 )
 . In
this case, it is straight forward to observe that the relevant critical values




C <  r
C <  r
L (12)
It implies that, if the cost of technology (r) is high ( rC < r <  rL), one rm
adopts the technology under Bertrand competition whereas none adopts un-
14der Cournot competition. That is, we get very asymmetric outcomes under
two alternative modes of product market competition. However, if the cost
of technology is moderate (rC < r <  rC), under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition one rm adopts the technology in equilibrium. Nonetheless,
the incentive to adopt technology by a single rm is higher under Bertrand
competition than under Cournot competition, since L




1 (0;0). This is because, following technology adoption, Bertrand
competition not only leads to lower prices (price eect), but also a lower
market share of the non-adopting rm (selection eect) than Cournot com-
petition. The selection eect dominates the price eect and the net gain,
from these two opposing eects, of the technology adopting rm is higher
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. As a result,
when the cost of technology is high, rms do not nd it protable to adopt
the technology under Cournot competition even when the other rm does
not adopt the technology. But, under Bertrand competition one rm gains
by adopting the technology when the other does not opt to adopt it. As a
result, cost-eciency of the industry improves under Bertrand competition
through technology adoption, whereas the industry remains less ecient un-
der Cournot competition as no rms adopts the technology - an `Arrow-like'
result. However, if the cost of technology reduces to the moderate level
(rC < r <  rC), the net gain from two opposing eects, price eect and
selection eect, becomes higher than the cost of technology under Cournot
competition also. As a result, when the cost of technology is moderate, we
get symmetric equilibrium outcomes in terms of technology adoption under
Cournot and Bertrand competition: one rm adopts the technology irrespec-
tive of the mode of competition. If the cost of technology reduces further to
the low level, rL < r < rC, both rms nd the technology adoption to be
15gainful under Cournot competition whereas under Bertrand competition a
rm gains by adopting the technology only if the other rm does not adopt
the technology, since the price eect is smaller under Cournot than under
Bertrand competition. If under Bertrand competition both rms adopt the
technology, each rm incurs loss. Therefore, when the cost of technology is
low, in equilibrium, both rms adopt the technology under Cournot competi-
tion whereas only one rm adopts the technology under Bertrand competition
- a `Schumpeter-type' result. The cost of technology needs to be reduced even
further to very low level (r < rL) to induce both rms to adopt the tech-
nology under Bertrand competition also. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium
choice of rms regarding technology adoption corresponding to dierent lev-
els of the cost of technology under alternative modes of competition. Clearly,
the industry becomes more cost-ecient under Bertrand competition than
under Cournot competition, if the cost of technology is high. Otherwise, level
of cost-eciency of the industry under Bertrand competition is same as that
under Cournot competition.6
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Figure 1: Cost of technology and technology adoption
Next, we turn to the scenario in which the marginal cost reduction (x)
6If the cost of technology is low, only one rm adopts the technology under Bertrand
competition, but the non-adopting rm is driven out of the market.
16through the technology adoption is relatively less, that is, 0 < x <
(a c)(2  2)
 .
In this scenario, as discussed in Section 2, both rms remain active in the
market irrespective of the mode of product market competition and the
cost of technology. Therefore, under Bertrand competition, a rm's gain
from technology adoption when the other rm does not adopt the tech-
nology is lower than that in the previous scenario. Also, under Bertrand
competition, when one rm adopts the technology, the other rm will also
nd it protable to adopt the technology provided that the cost of technol-
ogy is less than what is required in the previous scenario. It implies that,
rB < rL and  rB <  rL. Nonetheless, comparing critical values of the cost
of technology, as given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we get similar rankings





 , only the relative position of  rB and  rC changes, i.e., we
get 0 < rB < rC <  rB <  rC. Clearly, if
2(1 )(a c)
 < x <
(a c)(2  2)
 , the
comparison of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria remains same as before. How-
ever, since both rms remain active in equilibrium irrespective of the mode
of product market competition, the level of cost-eciency of the industry
is higher (lower) under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competi-
tion, if the cost of technology is low (high). But, when x <
2(1 )(a c)
 , the
comparison is as follows. (a) If  rB < r <  rC, no rm adopts the technology
under Bertrand competition whereas one rm adopts under Cournot compe-
tition. (b) If rC < r <  rB, one rm adopts the technology irrespective of the
mode of product market competition. (c) If rB < r < rC, both rms adopt
the technology under Cournot competition whereas only one rm adopts the
technology under Bertrand competition. (d) If 0 < r < rB (r >  rC), both
rms (no rm) adopt(s) the technology irrespective the mode of product
market competition. Therefore, if the cost reducing eect of the technol-
17ogy is low (x <
2(1 )(a c)
 ), the level of cost eciency of the industry is
same under both Bertrand and Cournot competition provided that the cost
of technology is moderate (rC < r <  rB); otherwise, the industry becomes
more cost-ecient under Cournot competition.
Proposition 1: (a) When the marginal cost of production reduces, due
to technology adoption, by more than a critical level (x >
(a c)(2  2)
 = x1,
say), the industry becomes more cost-ecient under Bertrand competition
than under Cournot competition if the cost of technology is high (r >  rC);
otherwise, both Bertrand and Cournot competition leads to the same level of
cost-eciency of the industry.
(b) If the amount of marginal cost reduction (x), due to technology adop-
tion, is less than x1 but greater than x2 (=
2(1 )(a c)
 ), Cournot competition
leads to lower (higher) level of cost-eciency of the industry than Bertrand
competition provided that the cost of technology is high (low: r < rC). How-
ever, if the technology reduces the marginal cost by less than the amount x2,
Cournot competition leads to more cost-eciency than the Bertrand compe-
tition unless the cost of technology is moderate (rC < r <  rB).
Clearly, the cost of technology has dierential impact on cost-eciency of
the industry under alternative modes of product market competition. This
result has implications to `technology subsidy' policies. Also, note that, if 
is closer to one, x1 is closer to zero. That is, if the degree of substitutability
between products is very high, the possibility of x > x1 is high. Therefore,
we can say that, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost-eciency of the
industry than Cournot competition when products are close substitutes pro-
vided that the cost of technology is high. On the other hand, if products are
highly dierentiated ( is close to zero), x2 is very large, i.e., the possibility
18of x < x2 is high and, thus, Cournot competition leads to more cost-eciency
of the industry than the Bertrand competition unless the cost of technology
is moderate. These results are similar to that in Bester and Petrakis (1993),
which argues that the incentive to innovate is higher (lower) under Cournot
competition than under Bertrand competition if the degree of substitutabil-
ity is low (high). However, note that the results of Bester and Petrakis
(1993) holds only for a selected range(s) of the cost of technology. Therefore,
in our set up, the results of Bester and Petrakis (1993) emerges as a special
case.
Proposition 1 also suggests that, the relation between intensity of com-
petition and technology adoption is not necessarily monotonic, which is in
line with Boone (2001). For example, given the degree of substitutability, if
the cost of technology is low (r < rC), Cournot competition leads to higher
cost-eciency of the industry than Bertrand competition when x < x1, but
the level of cost-eciency does not vary with the mode of product market
competition when x > x1.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have compared technology adoption in a dierentiated
duopoly under two alternative modes of product market competition, Cournot
and Bertrand. We have analysed how the cost of technology aects this com-
parisons in a more general setup by enlarging the parameter space so as to
relax the commonly subscribed assumption of positive primary outputs. We
have shown that the cost of technology has dierential impact on technology
adoption under alternatives modes of competition in the product market.
The possibility of ex post cost asymmetry is higher under Bertrand competi-
19tion than under Cournot competition. A comparison of ex post cost-eciency
of the industry reveals that, when the cost reducing eect of the technology
is high, Bertrand competition leads to higher cost eciency than Cournot
competition if the cost of technology is high; otherwise, cost-eciency of the
industry is invariant to the mode of product market competition. On the
other hand, unless the cost of technology is moderate, cost-eciency of the
industry is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competi-
tion when the technology reduces the marginal cost of production by a very
low amount. These results have implications to `technology subsidy' policies.
It seems to be interesting to extend the present analysis by considering
possible tradeo between product and process innovation. It might also
be interesting to examine the implications of (semi)collusion on technology
adoption and protability in the present context. We leave these issues for
future research.
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